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Abstract. The paper presents the solution to the topological equilibrium-existence problem 
for weighted network congestion games, which is the identification of all undirected two-
terminal networks on which every such game has a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
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1  Introduction 
A weighted network congestion game is played on a network, where each player has to 
choose a single route connecting the players’ common origin and destination vertices. The 
players’ alternatives may differ, however, since not all of them are necessarily allowed to 
use all edges. Players may also differ in their weights, which quantify their contributions to 
congestion at the edges belonging to their routes. As congestion increases, an edge’s cost 
weakly increases or the gain from using it weakly decreases. 
Games of this kind may naturally be used to model negative externalities with limited 
network resources. Costs may represent travel or service times, for example, and weights 
may represent the agents’ congestion impacts or their demands, which cannot be split 
among multiple routes. However, somewhat surprisingly, weighted network congestion 
games may also be used as concrete representations of arbitrary normal-form games: every 
finite game can be represented as (in other words, it is isomorphic to) such a network game 
(Milchtaich 2012).  
This representation result raises the question of what properties of the represented game 
can be inferred from partial information about the representation, in particular, information 
about the network used. A particularly interesting property is the existence of at least one 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  
The first example of a (two-player) weighted network congestion game without a pure-
strategy equilibrium was given by Libman and Orda (2001). (Other versions of the same 
example were considered by Fotakis et al. 2005, Goemans et al. 2005, and Milchtaich 
2006b). Libman and Orda raised as an interesting subject for further research the problem of 
identifying all non-parallel networks for which the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium is 
guaranteed in all corresponding weighted network congestion games, adding that series-
parallel networks, which are built from single edges using only the operations of connecting 
networks in series or in parallel, may be especially interesting.  
This topological (equilibrium-) existence problem is solved in the preset paper, which 
explicitly identifies all (undirected) two-terminal networks with the property that every 2 
weighted network congestion game on them, and therefore every finite game that can be 
represented as such a game, has a pure-strategy equilibrium.1 
The solution to the topological existence problem builds on partial results obtained in 
Milchtaich (2006b). These results, however, pertain to a narrower definition of weighted 
network congestion games, which in particular does not permit the players’ allowed routes 
to differ and thus renders these network games incapable of representing finite games 
where different players have different numbers of strategies. It is briefly discussed along 
with several other related models in the last section.  
One of the related models is (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific 
costs. In these games, players have identical weights, but on the other hand, the edges’ cost 
functions are not the same for all players. Like weighted network congestion games, these 
network games are capable of representing all finite games (Milchtaich 2012). However, for 
them, the topological existence problem is still open. 
2  Preliminaries 
2.1  Game theory 
A finite (noncooperative) game   has a finite number   of players whose strategy sets are 
finite. A strategy profile     (          ) in  , which assigns a strategy    to each player  , 
is a pure-strategy (Nash) equilibrium if none of the players can increase his payoff by 
unilaterally switching to another strategy.  
Two games   and    with the same number   of players are isomorphic (Monderer and 
Shapley 1996, Milchtaich 2012) if it is possible to (1) (re)number the players in    and (2) find 
a one-to-one function    from the strategy set of each player   in   onto that of player   
(according to the new numbering) in    such that the following condition holds: the payoff 
that each player   in   receives from each strategy profile (          ) is equal to the 
payoff that player   in    receives from the strategy profile (  (  )   (  )     (  )). 
Essentially, isomorphic games are just alternative representations of a single game.  
Two games   and    with identical sets of players and respective strategy sets are similar if 
for each player the difference between the payoffs in   and in    can be expressed as a 
function of the other players’ strategies. Equivalently, the gain or loss for a player from 
unilaterally switching from one strategy to another is always the same in both games. 
Similarity implies, in particular, that the two games are best-response equivalent (Monderer 
and Shapley 1996, Morris and Ui 2004). That is, a player’s strategy is a best response to the 
other players’ strategies in one game if and only if this is so in the other game. It follows that 
similar games have identical sets of pure-strategy equilibria.  
                                                            
1 Topological existence may have some relevance also to completely-specified finite games, for which the 
existence of pure-strategy equilibrium may in principle be determined by exhaustive search. This is because 
doing so may take a very long time if the number of players is large. In fact, the equilibrium-existence decision 
problem is NP-complete even if no player has more than two strategies, two possible payoffs and two other 
players who may affect his payoff (Fischer et al. 2006).  3 
A game   is an exact potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996) if it is similar to some 
game    in which all players have the same payoff function. The players’ common payoff 
function in    is said to be an exact potential for  . Note that this concept is a cardinal one: 
an increasing transformation of payoffs does not generally transform an exact potential 
game into another such game. An ordinal generalization of exact potential is generalized 
ordinal potential (Monderer and Shapley 1996), or simply potential, which is defined as a 
real-valued function over strategy profiles that strictly increases whenever a single player 
changes his strategy and increases his payoff as a result. Clearly, if a potential exists, then its 
(even “local”) maximum points are equilibria. However, the existence of a potential in a 
finite game implies more than the existence of equilibrium. It is equivalent to the finite 
improvement property: every improvement path (which is a finite sequence of strategy 
profiles where each profile differs from the preceding one only in the strategy of a single 
player, whose payoff increases as a result of the change) is finite. In other words, the game 
has no improvement cycles (which are finite improvement paths that start and terminate 
with the same profile). A potential does not necessarily exist in finite games that only 
possess the weaker finite best-(reply) improvement property. This property differs from the 
finite improvement property in only requiring finiteness of best-(reply) improvement paths 
(where each new strategy is a best response for the moving player, who in addition could 
not gain more by choosing some other strategy instead) or equivalently nonexistence of 
best-improvement cycles.   
The superposition of a finite number   of games with identical sets of players is the game 
with the same set of players where each player has to choose one of his strategies in each of 
the   games and his payoff is the sum of the resulting   payoffs. Thus, the   games are 
played simultaneously but independently. It is easy to see that a strategy profile in the 
superposition of   games is an equilibrium if and only if it induces (by projection) an 
equilibrium in each of the constituent   games.  
2.2  Graph theory 
An undirected multigraph consists of a finite set of vertices and a finite set of edges. Each 
edge   joins two distinct vertices, which are referred to as the end vertices of  . Thus, loops 
are not allowed but more than one edge can join two vertices. An edge   and a vertex   are 
incident with each other if   is an end vertex of  . A (simple) path of length   is an 
alternating sequence of vertices and edges                 , beginning and ending with 
vertices, in which each edge is incident with the two vertices immediately preceding and 
following it and all the vertices (and necessarily all the edges) are distinct. If the first and last 
vertices are clear from the context, the path may be written more simply as         . 
Every path traverses each of its edges   in a particular direction: from the end vertex that 
immediately precedes   in the path to the vertex that immediately follows it.   
A two-terminal network, or simply network,   is an undirected multigraph together with a 
distinguished ordered pair of (distinct) terminal vertices, the origin   and the destination  , 
such that each vertex and each edge belongs to at least one path that begins with   and 
ends with  . Such a path is called a route in  . It may itself be viewed as a network. Indeed, 
a route is an example of a sub-network of  , that is, a network that can be obtained from   
by deleting some of its edges and non-terminal vertices.  4 
 
Figure 1. Embedding. The left network is embedded in the wide sense in each of the other three, which are 
obtained from it by (a) subdividing an edge, (b) adding a new edge, and, finally, (c) subdividing the destination. 
The sub-network relation is a special case of the following one. A network   is embedded in 
the wide sense2 in a network    if the latter can be obtained from the former by applying the 
following operations any number of times in any order (see Figure 1). Each operation 
increases the number of edges by one and creates a new network with the same terminal 
vertices as the original network. 
(a)  Subdivision of an edge: its replacement by two edges with a single common end 
vertex.  
(b)  Addition of a new edge joining two existing vertices. 
(c)  Subdivision of a terminal vertex: addition of a new edge   that joins   or   with a 
new vertex  , followed by the replacement of the terminal vertex by   as the end 
vertex in two or more edges originally incident with the former.  
Two networks are isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets 
of vertices, and another such correspondence between the sets of edges, such that the 
incidence relation is preserved and the origin and destination in one network are paired with 
the origin and destination, respectively, in the other network. Isomorphic networks may be, 
and they normally are, identified. Two networks are homeomorphic if they can be obtained 
from the same network by successive subdivision of edges, in other words, if each can be 
obtained from the other by the insertion and removal of non-terminal vertices of degree 
two (that is, vertices incident with only two edges).  
A network   may be connected with another network   , which does not share any of its 
edges and vertices, in parallel or in series. The sets of vertices and edges in the resulting 
network are the unions of the corresponding sets in   and   , except that, for a connection 
in parallel, the two origin vertices are identified and the two destination vertices are 
identified, and for a connection in series, the destination in   and the origin in    are 
identified and become a non-terminal vertex. The connection of an arbitrary number of 
                                                            
2 This notion of embedding, which was introduced in Milchtaich (2005), is more inclusive than that used in 
Milchtaich (2006a), which restricts terminal subdivision (operation (c) below) to the special case of terminal 
extension (in which all the edges originally incident with the terminal vertex become incident with the new 
vertex   instead). Embedding in the wide sense roughly corresponds to the notion of a minor of a graph (see 
Diestel 2005), while embedding in the sense of Milchtaich (2006a) corresponds to a topological minor. 
(a)  (b)  (c) 
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networks in parallel or in series is defined recursively. Each of the connected networks is 
embedded in the wide sense in the resulting one. A parallel network is a network that has 
only one edge or is made of several single-edge networks connected in parallel. 
2.3  Network congestion games 
A weighted network congestion game on a (two-terminal3) network   is a finite,  -player 
game that is defined as follows. First, each edge in   is assigned a nondecreasing cost 
function4    (   )   (    ), an allowable direction, which must be that in which some 
route in   traverses the edge, and a (possibly, empty) set of allowable users. An edge is 
public or private if it allowable to all players or to one player only, respectively. It is required 
that each player   has at least one allowable route, that is, a route in   that includes only 
edges that   is allowed to use and traverses them in the allowable direction. The collection of 
all such routes is the player’s strategy set   . Second, a weight        is specified for each 
player  , which represents the player’s congestion impact and is also (weakly) connected 
with the cardinality of his strategy set: For all   and   with        , |  |   |  |.5 The total 
weight     of the players whose chosen route includes an edge   is the flow (or load) on  . 
The cost of   for each of its users is   (   ). A player’s payoff in the game is the negative of 
the total cost of the edges in his route.  
A strategy-symmetric (or simply “symmetric”) weighted network congestion game is one in 
which all players share the same set of allowable routes. A weighted network congestion 
game is referred to as an unweighted network congestion game if the players’ weights are 
all identical and equal to  . The equality of the weights entails, in particular, that the cost of 
an edge is not affected by the identities of its users but only by their number. A 
generalization that allows for a dependence of the cost for a user on his own identity is 
(unweighted) network congestion game with player-specific costs. In such a game, each edge 
  is associated with a (player-specific) nondecreasing cost function     (   )   (    ) 
for each player  , and its cost for that player is    (   ), where (the flow)     is the total 
number of players using  . Since player-specific costs provide an alternative way of 
effectively limiting the players’ use of the edges, strategy-symmetry would have little bite 
for this kind of games.  
The very specific definitions of network congestion games make them appear special. 
However, as the following theorem (Milchtaich 2012) shows, in a very fundamental sense, 
they are not.  
                                                            
3 The assumption of a single origin–destination pair may be viewed as a normalization. Any weighted network 
congestion game on a multi-commodity network, which has multiple origin–destination pairs, may also be viewed 
as a game with a single such pair. In that game, each terminal vertex is incident with a single allowable edge (see 
below) for each player, which joins it with the player’s corresponding terminal vertex in the original game. 
4 The definition of cost function allows for negative costs, which may be interpreted as (net) gains from using the 
edge. However, such costs do not play any role in Section ‎ 3, where all the results would hold also with the more 
restrictive definition that allows only nonnegative cost functions, with range     ). 
5 The cardinality assumption is used in the proof of Lemma 4. Whether or not it can be dispensed with I do not 
know. The assumption trivially holds if all players have the same number of strategies. It also holds if the 
allowable users of each edge are those whose weight does not exceed a certain threshold.  6 
 
Figure 2. Two-player weighted network congestion game (a) and weighted network congestion game in the 
wide sense (b). The players’ weights are        and       . Dotted, dashed and solid edges are allowable to 
player 1, player 2 and both players, respectively. The allowable directions are indicated where needed. 
All relevant costs other than those specified are zero. A player’s payoff is the negative of his total cost. The 
game’ normal (or strategic) forms are shown at the bottom.  
Theorem 1. Every finite game   is isomorphic both to a weighted network congestion game 
   and to an (unweighted) network congestion game with player-specific costs   .   is 
isomorphic to an unweighted network congestion game6 if and only if it is an exact potential 
game. 
3  The Existence Property 
A (two-terminal) network   has the (equilibrium-) existence property for weighted network 
congestion games if every such game on   has at least one pure-strategy (Nash) equilibrium. 
As the following lemma shows, this property of networks is “hereditary”.  
Lemma 1. If a network has the existence property, then so does every network embedded in 
the wide sense in it and every network homeomorphic to it.  
Proof (an outline). The proof is based on the repeated use of the following argument. A 
weighted network congestion game without a pure-strategy equilibrium on a network   can 
be “extended” to such a game on any network that is obtained from   by applying any of 
the three operations that define embedding in the wide sense (Figure 1) and to any network 
from which   is obtained by the subdivision of an edge. The operation of adding a new edge 
can be made inconsequential by not allowing any player to use it, and the new edge that is 
created by edge or terminal subdivision can be made insignificant by allowing all players to 
use it at zero cost. (In the case of the subdivision of an edge into two edges, it does not 
matter which of them is declared the new edge, since only the sum of their costs matters.)
                      ∎ 
                                                            
6 This condition can be expressed as the requirement that        . 
(         





   ( )     
   ( )     
 
   ( )         ( )     
       
       
       
       
(a) 
   ( )    
 
 
   
  
 
(         
           ) 
 
   ( )     
       
   
  




   









Figure 3. A two-terminal network that is homeomorphic to any of those depicted is said to be nearly parallel. 
A gray, unnamed curve indicates an optional edge and a gray ellipsis mark indicates any number of such edges. 
The networks in (a)–(f) have the existence property for weighted network congestion games, which means 
that every such game on them has a pure-strategy equilibrium. The networks in (g)–(j) lack this property.  
Another way to obtain a network   with the existence property from other networks with 
that property it to connect the latter in series. The reason the connected networks bestow 
the existence property on   is that, as the proof of the following lemma shows, any network 
congestion game on   is the superposition (see Section ‎ 2.1) of such games on them.  
Lemma 2. A network made of two or more networks connected in series has the existence 
property if and only if each of the constituent networks has that property.  
Proof. Let   be a network made of   (   ) networks,           , connected in series. For 
each player, choosing an allowable route   in   is equivalent to choosing   allowable routes 
            in           , respectively, and connecting them is series. Therefore, every 
weighted network congestion game   on   can be represented as the superposition of   
such games – one on each constituent network. In each of the   games, the players and 
their weights, as well as the cost function and the allowable direction and users for each 
edge, are as in  . This proves that if for             every weighted network congestion 
game on    has a pure-strategy equilibrium, this is so also for  .  
Conversely, if there is a weighted network congestion game without an equilibrium on   , 
for some          , then a game with similar properties exists on  . Specifically, the 
superposition of the game on    and any games with constant payoffs on the other       
networks is (isomorphic to) a game on   that does not have an equilibrium.  ∎ 
(f)  (g)  (h)  (i)  (j) 
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Figure 4. The forbidden networks. On each of these networks, there are weighted network congestion games 
without pure-strategy equilibria.  
The main result of this paper is the following theorem, which identifies all networks with the 
existence property for weighted network congestion games.  
Theorem 2. For a two-terminal network  , the following conditions are equivalent: 
(i)  Every weighted network congestion game on   has a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
(ii)    is homeomorphic to one of the networks in Figure 3(a)–(f) or to a network made of 
several such networks connected in series. 
(iii) None of the networks in Figure 3(g)–(j) or Figure 4 is embedded in the wide sense in  . 
As an illustration of Theorem 2, it follows from it that not all weighted network congestion 
games on the (underlying undirected) network in Figure 2(a) have pure-strategy equilibria. 
This conclusion also follows from the fact that every       game can be represented as a 
weighted network congestion game on that particular network (Milchtaich 2012). As evident 
from its normal form, the specific game shown in Figure 2(a) does have a pure-strategy 
equilibrium, indeed, a dominant-strategy one. Interestingly, however, it can be shown that a 
weighted network congestion game with the same normal form does not exist on any two-
terminal network with the existence property. Thus, the existence of pure-strategy 
equilibrium in that simple       normal-form game cannot be linked with the network 
topology. Viewed from a wider perspective, this finding is not surprising. In any game, any 
(pure) strategy profile can be made an equilibrium by changing only the payoffs associated 
with it. There is in general no reason to expect this “local” change to bring about 
representability as a network congestion game on a particular kind of network, which is a 
“global” property of the game in the sense of depending on all payoffs.  
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the results and (counter-) examples presented in the 
following two subsections. The proof itself is given at the end of the section.  
3.1  Networks with the existence property 
The simplest kind of network with the existence property for weighted network congestion 
games is a parallel network, with any number of edges (Figure 3(a) and (f)). In fact, with such 
a network, a stronger property than equilibrium existence is guaranteed (Milchtaich 1996). 
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Lemma 3. Every weighted network congestion game   on a parallel network has the finite 
improvement property. 
Proof. The following argument (Even-Dar et al. 2003, Fabrikant et al. 2004) identifies a 
specific (generalized ordinal) potential for  . As the number   of all possible payoffs in the 
game is finite, they can be listed in an ascending order. Associate with each strategy profile 
an  -tuple, in which the  th entry (           ) is the number of players whose payoff is 
the  th entry in that list. Next, rank all strategy profiles lexicographically with respect to 
these  -tuples. Thus, the highest-ranking strategy profile has the smallest number of 
players receiving the lowest possible payoff, and in case of a tie, the smallest number of 
players with the second-lowest payoff among the tied strategy profiles, and so on. The 
function   that returns for each strategy profile its rank is a potential for  . Whenever a 
single player   unilaterally changes his strategy and increases his payoff as a result, the new 
strategy profile is ranked higher than the original one. This is because the only other players 
negatively affected by player  ’s move are those using his new strategy, and their new payoff 
is equal to  ’s new payoff and hence higher than his old one.  ∎ 
By Lemmas 2 and 3, any network that can be constructed by connecting two or more parallel 
networks in series (for example, the figure-eight network) has the existence property. 
However, none of the networks in Figure 3(b)–(e) can be constructed in this way. Indeed, 
the one in (e), dubbed the Wheatstone network, is not even series-parallel, meaning that it 
cannot be constructed from networks with single edges by any sequence of operations of 
connecting networks in series or in parallel. Establishing the existence property for these 
non-parallel networks requires a different approach than that employed in Lemma 3. 
Indeed, it follows as an immediate corollary from the next example that (even three-player) 
weighted network congestion games on any of them may have (even best-) improvement 
cycles. Although the game in the example has a pure-strategy equilibria, a specific order of 
moves may be required to reach any of them from a given initial strategy profile.  
Example 1. Three players, with weights             and       , choose routes in the 
network in Figure 3(b). The cost functions are given (for          ) by    ( )  
      ( )             ( )               and    ( )          . It can be verified that, 
starting with the strategy profile in which the routes of players 1 and 2 include    and that of 
player 3 includes   , the following is an improvement cycle: player 1 moves to use   , player 
2 moves to use   , player 3 also moves to use   , player 1 moves back to   , player 2 does 
the same, and player 3 moves back to use   , thus completing the cycle. (The cycle can 
moreover be made a best-improvement one simply by not allowing each player to use the 
single edge he does not actually use.) Note that an equilibrium would be immediately 
reached if player 2, rather than 1, moved first (to   ), and a different equilibrium would be 
reached if player 3, rather than 2, moved second (to   ).  
Somewhat unintuitively, the first step in extending topological existence beyond parallel 
networks is establishing it for a special kind of parallel networks, namely, those in Figure 
3(a), but for a larger class of games, where a player’s weight may only impact the other 
players’ costs. In a weighted network congestion game in the wide sense (see example in 
Figure 2(b)), each edge   is associated with a pair of nondecreasing cost functions, 10 
   (   )   (    ) and        )   (    ), and its cost for each player   is given by  
  (   )     (        )  
The second term differs from the first in that it does not involve self-effect: the argument 
         is the total weight of the other users of  , excluding player   himself. Lack of self-
effect may entail that the cost of an edge is lower for higher-weight players than for lower-
weight ones. Thus, as in a network congestion game with player-specific costs, an edge’s cost 
is not necessarily the same for all users. Parenthetically, for weighted network congestion 
games in the wide sense, a result similar to Lemma 3 does not hold. Indeed, the finite 
improvement property is not guaranteed even on a three-edge parallel network.  
Lemma 4. Every weighted network congestion game in the wide sense   on a parallel 
network   with three or fewer edges has a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that   has precisely three edges (some of which 
may not be allowable to any player), and hence three routes. Identify the edges with three 
points on an imaginary cycle and say that edge   follows (precedes) edge    if the latter is 
the first edge encountered with when moving along the cycle from   in the clockwise 
(respectively, counterclockwise) direction. There are two possible cases: either no player has 
more than two allowable edges, or at least one player is allowed to use all three. The 
analysis of both cases uses the following simple result. 
Claim 1. Let   and    be two edges in   that are both allowable to two players   and  . If 
both players use   but only   would benefit from unilaterally moving to   , then        . 
The premise in Claim 1 means that the flows on   and    and the respective cost functions 
are such that  
(   (        )      (   ))   (  (   )     (        ))
      (   (        )      (   ))   (  (   )     (        ))  
The conclusion follows from the monotonicity of the cost functions     and   .  
First case: No player is allowed to use all edges. Associate with each strategy profile (which 
assigns an edge in   to each player) the total weight   ̂ of the players whose edge follows 
another edge that is allowable for them. There is obviously a unique strategy with   ̂    , 
which trivially satisfies the following: 
Each of the players is either not allowed to or would not benefit from moving from 
his edge to the preceding edge.  
Since   ̂ cannot be greater than the total weight of the players, to prove that an equilibrium 
exists it suffices to establish the following.  
Claim 2. For every strategy profile satisfying   that is not an equilibrium, there is another 
strategy profile satisfying   with a higher   ̂.  
To prove Claim 2, consider a strategy profile satisfying   such that the cost to some player   
can be reduced by moving   from his edge    to some (allowable) edge  , which is 
( ) 11 
necessarily the one following   . Such a move creates a strategy profile with a higher flow on 
  and a lower flow on   . That strategy profile may or may not have property  . However, 
due to the monotonicity of the costs,   does not hold only if for one or more of the players 
using   moving to (the preceding) edge    is both allowed and beneficial. If this is so, move 
the highest-weight such player from   to   , and repeat doing so until no more players can 
benefit from this move. Clearly, player   is not one of the movers. Indeed, his incentive to 
return to    can only get lower with each move, and therefore Claim 1 implies that         
for each of the movers  . Thus, the strategy profile reached after the last move differs from 
the original one in that player   uses   rather than   , and the opposite is true for a certain 
number (possibly, zero) of other players. The total weight    of these players must satisfy 
       . Otherwise, for each of them  , the monotonicity of the cost functions and the fact 
that         would imply the following: 
(   (   )      (        ))   (  (        )     (   ))
  (   (             )      (        ))   (  (        )     (             ))  
However, the left-hand side is (strictly) negative at least for the player   who was the last to 
move from   to    (otherwise the move would not have benefited him), while the right-hand 
side is (strictly) positive since it gives the reduction in the cost to   when he moved from    
to  . This shows that the above inequality, and hence also        , cannot hold.  
The result that         is positive means that     is higher, and     is lower, than the 
respective flows in the original strategy profile, before   moved. Therefore, there are still no 
players who would gain from moving to   from the third edge in   (which follows  ) or from 
moving to that edge from   . Hence,   holds for the new as well as for the original strategy 
profile. In the former, the total weight   ̂ of the players whose edge follows another 
allowable edge is higher by         than in the latter. This completes the proof of Claim 2. 
Second case:   has some players   with three allowable edges, possibly in addition to players 
  with only one or two. Re-index the players in the game in such a way that, for some 
         , the inequalities           hold for all players   and   as above (who differ in their 
number of strategies) and         holds for all   and   with      . (The cardinality 
assumption in the definition of weighted network congestion game implies that such re-
indexing is possible.) For each player  , define    as the game obtained from   by “taking 
out”   and all the lower-index players, so that these players do not choose routes and do not 
contribute to the flows. In addition, define       .  
It follows from the first part of the proof that   , whose set of players (which may be empty) 
consists of all the players in   with one or two allowable edges, has a pure-strategy 
equilibrium. To prove that such an equilibrium exists also in  , it suffices to show that, for all 
         , the existence of an equilibrium in    implies the same for     . In fact, for any 
equilibrium in   , simply choosing a best response strategy for player   gives an equilibrium 
in     . Clearly, any player   whose edge is different from the edge   chosen by   still cannot 
gain from changing his strategy. (His incentive to do so is, if anything, even lower than 
before.) The same is true if  ’s strategy is  . Since        , and since moving from   to any 
other edge    is not beneficial to  , it follows from Claim 1 that the same applies to  .  ∎ 12 
The significance of Lemma 4 lies in the fact that every weighted network congestion game in 
the wide sense (and, in particular, every such game in the “regular” sense)   on any of the 
non-parallel networks in Figure 3(b)–(e) is similar (see Section ‎ 2.1) to such a game on a 
parallel network as in (a). That game is obtained from   by a procedure that may be dubbed 
parallelization. The procedure, which is described in the proof of the following lemma, both 
changes the network and transforms some cost functions with self-effect (  ’s) into cost 
functions without self-effect (  ’s) and vice versa. This suggests that the two kinds of cost 
functions may be intimately connected. 
Lemma 5. Every weighted network congestion game in the wide sense   on any of the 
networks   in Figure 3(b)–(e) is similar to such a game   ̃ on a parallel network with three 
edges. 
Proof. Let   ̃ be the parallel network, with edges   ,    and   , that is obtained from   by 
contracting (Diestel 2005) edge   , that is, eliminating the edge and its non-terminal vertex 
(this operation is the one-sided inverse of terminal subdivision, Figure 1(c)) and, if   has five 
edges, also contracting   . Each of the three routes in   ̃ corresponds to a route in  , which 
includes the former’s single edge and traverses it in the same direction. This correspondence 
between routes is one-to-one and onto, with one exception. The single exception is route 
       in the Wheatstone network (Figure 3(e)), which does not have a corresponding route 
in the parallel network. However, that route may be ignored since, by symmetry, it suffices 
to consider network congestion games on the Wheatstone network in which the allowable 
direction of    is from   to  . Thus, it suffices to consider games   on   in which every route 
that is allowable for some player has a corresponding (single-edge) route in   ̃. The next step 
is to describe the corresponding game   ̃ on   ̃. 
The following description concerns the case in which   is the Wheatstone network. The 
other three cases (Figure 3(b)–(d)) are rather similar (indeed, somewhat simpler). The game 
  ̃ on   ̃ inherits its set of players and their weights and strategy sets from   (with the 
identification of routes in   and   ̃ described above). The cost functions in   ̃ (which are 
accented by a tilde) are derived from those in   (unaccented) as follows. For            
 , where     ∑       is the players’ total weight,  
 ̃  ( )      ( )     ̃  ( )      ( ) 
 ̃  ( )      ( )      (     )    ̃  ( )      ( )      (     ) 
  ̃  ( )      ( )      (     )    ̃  ( )      ( )      (     ) 
 
It has to be shown that the games   and   ̃ are similar. That is, for every player  , the 
difference between the costs to   in   and in   ̃ can be expressed as a function of the route 
choices of the other players. If  ’s route includes    (hence, does not include    or   ), the 
difference can be written as  
   (           )      (      )      (           )      (      )  
where        is the total weight of the players other than   whose route does not include 
  , and similarly for       . The same expression gives the difference between the costs in   
and   ̃ also if  ’s route does include either    or   . For example, if the route includes (only) 
(1) 13 
  , its total cost for   in   is    (        )      (             )      (    )      (         ), 
and in   ̃ the cost is  ̃  (    )     ̃  (         ). It is not difficult to see that the difference 
between the costs can again be written as (1). Thus, the difference is independent of  ’s 
route, as had to be shown.    ∎ 
Parenthetically, the assertion of Lemma 5 cannot be strengthened to isomorphism between 
  and   ̃. In other words, the finite games representable as weighted network congestion 
games in the wide sense on the networks in Figure 3(b)–(e) constitute a proper superset of 
those representable using (a). For example, it is not difficult to show that the       game in 
Figure 2(b) cannot be represented as a weighted network congestion game in the wide 
sense on any parallel network; no such game shares its normal form.  
An immediate corollary of the last two lemmas is the following result, which together with 
Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 establishes the “positive” part of Theorem 2.  
Lemma 6. Every weighted network congestion game in the wide sense on a network 
homeomorphic to one of those in Figure 3(a)–(e) has a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
3.2  Networks without the existence property 
A network without the existence property can be obtained from any network 
homeomorphic to one of those in Figure 3(b)–(e) simply by the addition of any single edge. 
This is because the resulting network necessarily has one (or more) of those in Figure 3(g)–(j) 
or Figure 4 embedded in it in the wide sense. As the following five examples show, there are 
four-player weighted network congestion games on the networks in Figure 3(g)–(j) and 
three-player games on those in Figure 4 that do not have pure-strategy equilibria. It can 
moreover be shown that, for at least most of these networks, these numbers of players are 
minimal for non-existence of equilibrium. Specifically, every three-player weighted network 
congestion game in the wide sense on any of the networks in Figure 3(g)–(i) has a pure-
strategy equilibrium, and the same is true for every two-player such game on any of the 
networks in Figure 4.  
Example 2. Four players, with weights       ,        and            , choose routes in 
one of the networks in Figure 3(g)–(j). Each player has two allowable routes, which each 
includes exactly one of the edges   ,   ,    and   . The “left” route for player 1, 2, 3 and 4 
includes   ,   ,    and   , respectively, and the “right” route includes   ,   ,    and   , 
respectively. The cost functions of edges   ,   ,   ,    and    are positive and satisfy 
   ( )          ( )        ( )        ( )         ( )          ( )        ( )  
      ( )          ( )        ( )         ( )      and    ( )        ( )        ( )  
 . For all other edges   (if the network has them),       . It can be verified that “left” is the 
better choice for player 3, player 1 or player 4 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 
or player 1, respectively, is also “left”. Therefore, in any equilibrium where player 2 plays 
“left” or “right”, the other players necessarily do the same. However, this means that in the 
former case player 2 can decrease his cost from    to   by (unilaterally) changing his choice 
to “right”, and in the latter case, he can decrease it from    to    by changing to “left”. This 
proves that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist.  14 
In all but one of the networks considered in Example 2, there is only one way to direct the 
edges. The exception is the network in Figure 3(j), where    and    may have identical or 
opposite directions. In Example 2, the former holds, and in the next example, the latter 
holds. This proves that, for Figure 3(j), and trivially also for all the other networks in Figure 3 
and Figure 4, directionality is not an important consideration: pre-determining the edges’ 
directions would not affect equilibrium existence.  
Example 3. This example differs from the previous one in that it only refers to Figure 3(j) and 
in that the players’ routes are different: “left” for player 1, 2, 3 and 4 means        ,     , 
       and     , respectively, and “right” means      ,      ,      and        , respectively. 
(Note that, for player 3, the two routes are actually on the sides opposite to those suggested 
by their names.) In addition, the cost functions are different, and satisfy    ( )  
     ( )        ( )         ( )         ( )        ( )         ( )          ( )  
     ( )         ( )          ( )        ( )        ( )      and     ( )         ( )  
       ( )     . It can be verified that “left” is the better choice for player 3, player 1 or 
player 4 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is also “left”. 
Therefore, in any equilibrium where player 2 plays “left” or “right”, the other players 
necessarily do the same. However, this means that in the former case player 2 can decrease 
his cost from    to    by (unilaterally) changing his choice to “right”, and in the latter case, 
he can decrease it from    to    by changing to “left”. This proves that a pure-strategy 
equilibrium does not exist.  
Example 4. Three players, with weights        and            , choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(a) or in that in (b). The only restrictions on route choices are that edge 
   is only allowable to player 2, who is not allowed to use   , and    is only allowable to 
player 3, who is not allowed to use   . Thus, there are two allowable routes for each player: 
“left”, which includes   , and “right”, which does not. The costs of the two private edges 
satisfy    ( )     and    ( )     . Those of the other edges are given (for      ) by 
   ( )    ,    ( )            (         )  and    ( )    . It can be verified that “left” is 
the better choice for player 1, player 2 or player 3 if and only if the strategy of player 2, 
player 3 or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It follows that a pure-strategy equilibrium does 
not exist.  
Example 5. Three players, with weights        and            , choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(c). The only restrictions are that edge    is only allowable to player 2, 
who is not allowed to use   , and    is only allowable to player 3, who is not allowed to use 
  . Thus, there are two allowable routes to each player: “left”, which does not include   , 
and “right”, which does. The costs of the two private edges satisfy    ( )     and 
   ( )    , and those of the other edges satisfy    ( )        ( )        ( )  
      ( )        ( )         ( )      and    ( )     . It can be verified that “left” is the 
better choice for player 1, player 2 or player 3 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 
or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It follows that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. 
Example 6. Three players, with weights       ,        and        , choose routes in the 
network in Figure 4(d). The only restrictions are that edge    is only allowable to player 2, 
who is not allowed to use   , and    is only allowable to player 3, who is not allowed to use 15 
  . Thus, there are two allowable routes for each player: “left”, which does not include   , 
and “right”, which does. Three of the edges have constant costs,          ,            and 
        , and three have increasing costs,    ( )         ( )      and    ( )       √ . 
It can be verified that “left” is the better choice for player 1, player 2 or player 3 if and only if 
the strategy of player 2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is “right”. It follows that a pure-
strategy equilibrium does not exist. 
Another example of a game without a pure-strategy equilibrium on the network in Figure 
4(d) can be obtained from Example 5 by simply setting        . 
Theorem 2 can now be proved. The proof uses a graph theoretic result (Milchtaich 2005) 
that relates all (two-terminal) networks to two special kinds of networks. A nearly parallel 
network is any network that either has only one route or can be constructed by 
(1) connecting two single-route networks in parallel, (2) adding any number of edges with 
identical end vertices and, finally, (3) subdividing each of these edges any number of times. 
Depending on whether at most one edge or more than one edge was added, the nearly 
parallel network is homeomorphic to one of those at the upper or lower row, respectively, in 
Figure 3. A forbidden network is any of the four networks depicted in Figure 4.  
Proof of Theorem 2. It is shown in Milchtaich (2005, Proposition 2.1) that, for every two-
terminal network  , one (and only one) of the following conditions holds: (1)   is nearly 
parallel or it consists of two or more nearly parallel networks connected in series, and 
(2) one of the forbidden networks is embedded in the wide sense in  . It follows form this 
result that, if condition (iii) in the theorem holds, so does (ii). 
If condition (i) in the theorem holds for a network  , then it follows from Lemma 1 and 
Examples 2, 4, 5 and 6 that condition (iii) also holds, which, as indicated, implies that (ii) 
holds. If condition (i) does not hold, then it follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 6 that condition 
(ii) also does not hold, which implies that (iii) does not hold.  ∎ 
For weighted network congestion games in the wide sense, a result very similar to Theorem 
2 holds, except that the networks in Figure 3(f) are removed from condition (ii) and put into 
(iii). The proof is very similar to that above, but it also uses the following example, which is 
obtained from Example 2 by parallelization (see the proof of Lemma 5).  
Example 7. Four players, with weights       ,        and            , choose routes in 
the network in Figure 3(f). Each player has two allowable routes: “left”, which for player 1, 2, 
3 and 4 means   ,   ,    and   , respectively, and “right”, which means   ,   ,    and   , 
respectively. The costs of the edges satisfy    ( )          ( )        ( )        ( )  
      ( )          ( )        ( )         ( )      and    ( )        ( )  
      ( )     . In addition,        for all edges   except   , for which    ( )  
     ( )        ( )    . It can be verified that “left” is the better choice for player 3, 
player 1 or player 4 if and only if the strategy of player 2, player 3 or player 1, respectively, is 
also “left”. Therefore, in any equilibrium where player 2 plays “left” or “right”, the other 
players necessarily do the same. However, this means that in the former case player 2 can 
decrease his cost from   to   by (unilaterally) changing his choice to “right”, and in the latter 16 
case, he can decrease it from    to    by changing to “left”. This proves that a pure-strategy 
equilibrium does not exist. 
4  Related Models and Open Problems  
Existence of pure-strategy equilibrium is one of several properties of network congestion 
games that can be linked to the network topology. Another example is the property that all 
pure-strategy equilibria in the game are strong. Holzman and Law-yone (1997, 2003) proved 
that this property is shared by all strategy-symmetric unweighted network congestion games 
on a network if and only if it is extension-parallel, which means that is can be built from 
single-edge networks by repeatedly connecting networks in series or in parallel, with the 
proviso that in the former case at most one network can have more than one edge. An 
equivalent way of stating this result is that an extension-parallel network is a necessarily and 
sufficient condition for weak Pareto efficiency of all equilibria in all corresponding games, 
which means that it is never possible to alter the players’ equilibrium route choices in a way 
that benefits them all. The equivalence holds because an equilibrium is strong if and only if 
the strategy choices of every subset of players constitute a weak Pareto efficient equilibrium 
in the subgame defined by fixing the strategies of the remaining players. That subgame is 
itself a strategy-symmetric unweighted network congestion game on the same network. 
The above result was originally established for directed networks, that is, with the edges’ 
directions fixed as part of the network’s specification. However, it holds also in the present 
setting of undirected networks, where the edges’ directions may vary with the game 
considered. An undirected network is extension-parallel if and only if it has linearly 
independent routes, in the sense that each route includes at least one edge that is not part 
of any other route (Milchtaich 2006a). 
A similar connection between the network topology and the weak Pareto efficiency of all 
equilibria holds for nonatomic network congestion games with a continuum of identical 
players (Milchtaich 2006a). A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Pareto efficiency of 
all equilibria in all nonatomic network congestion games on a network – regardless of the 
cost functions and the directions that the game assigns to the edges – is that it has linearly 
independent routes. Moreover, unlike in the finite case, this result holds also with non-
identical players, that is, with player-specific cost functions.   
A network has the uniqueness property for a particular variety of network congestion games 
if in every game of that kind on the network the players’ (pure-strategy) equilibrium costs 
are unique. This topological property is not relevant for finite network congestion games, 
where it is virtually impossible to guarantee uniqueness, or for nonatomic ones with 
identical cost functions, where the equilibrium costs are always unique. For nonatomic 
network congestion games with player-specific costs, a network has the uniqueness 
property if and only if it is nearly parallel (Figure 3) or it consists of two or more nearly 
parallel networks connected in series (Milchtaich 2005). The complementary class of all 
networks for which multiple equilibrium costs are possible consists of all the networks in 
which one of the forbidden networks (Figure 4) is embedded in the wide sense. A similar 
result holds for network congestion games with finitely many players in which flow is 
splittable among multiple routes (Richman and Shimkin 2007).   17 
The topological efficiency and uniqueness problems for nonatomic network congestion 
games are not directly related to the topological existence problem studied in this paper, 
which concerns finite games. (For nonatomic network congestion games, the existence of 
pure-strategy equilibrium is not an issue, since it is guaranteed by weak assumptions on the 
cost functions; see Schmeidler 1970.) Nevertheless, the solutions to the three problems turn 
out to have broadly similar forms. In particular, each topological property is equivalent to 
the nonexistence of an embedded (in the wide sense) network belonging to a particular 
short list of “bad” networks. The solutions are also all formulated in terms of undirected 
networks, which may attest to the practical merit of viewing directionality as belonging to 
the game rather than pre-determined by the network. However, this perspective leaves 
open the following question: For which directed networks is the existence of equilibrium 
guaranteed in all weighted network congestion games that respect the edges’ directions? 
The remarks that precede Example 3 may be the first step in answering this question. 
The rest of this section considers several other models that are related to but different from 
the one studied in Section ‎ 3, in particular models for which the topological existence 
problem is still open.  
4.1  Strategy-symmetry 
The existence property for strategy-symmetric weighted network congestion games, where 
all players share the same set of allowable routes, is less demanding than in the general case 
considered above (Theorem 2). In particular, it holds for the nearly parallel networks in 
Figure 3(g)–(i). This result is in proved in Milchtaich (2006b) by first showing that every 
strategy-symmetric weighted network congestion game in the wide sense on a parallel 
network (even one with four or more edges; Figure 3(f)) has a pure-strategy equilibrium. 
Indeed, an equilibrium can easily be found by employing the greedy best response algorithm 
(Fotakis et al. 2006), whereby the players enter the game one by one with heavier players 
entering first (see the proof of Lemma 4, Second case). A parallelization argument similar to 
that in Lemma 5 then extends the result to all networks in Figure 3(a)–(i). (The argument 
partially applies also to the remaining nearly parallel networks, which are represented by 
Figure 3(j). However, it only applies to games in which the edges with end vertices   and   
all have the same allowable direction: from   to   or vice versa.) 
The main open problem regarding the topological existence property for strategy-symmetric 
weighted network congestion games is whether, and to what extent, the existence property 
holds for networks that are not nearly parallel or made of several nearly parallel networks 
connected in series. In particular, it is not known whether any of the forbidden networks has 
this property. An example of a network (with linearly independent routes) that does not 
have the property is obtained from the forbidden network in Figure 4(a) by subdividing    
and joining the resulting new vertex with   by a new edge. A strategy-symmetric weighted 
network congestion game on this network that does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium is 
presented in Milchtaich (2006b). 
The desirability of solving the above topological existence problem is underlined by the fact 
that deciding whether a given strategy-symmetric weighted network congestion game on a 18 
general network has a pure-strategy equilibrium can be computationally difficult. In fact, 
Dunkel and Schulz (2008) showed that this decision problem is NP-complete.  
4.2  Player-specific costs 
Another open problem is the characterization of the networks with the existence property 
for (unweighted) network congestion games with player-specific costs. It is known that these 
include all parallel networks, even though games of this kind on them are not guaranteed to 
have the finite improvement property (Milchtaich 1996). As for strategy-symmetric 
weighted network congestion games, a parallelization argument extends this result to all 
nearly parallel networks in Figure 3(a)–(i) (and partially to (j)). The set of networks that are 
known not to have the existence property only partially overlaps the corresponding set for 
strategy-symmetric weighted network congestion games. It includes the networks obtained 
by adding: (1) an edge with end vertices   and   to the network in Figure 4(a) (equivalently, 
end vertices   and   in (b) or   and   in (c)), (2) an edge with end vertices   and   to the 
network in Figure 4(d), or (3) an edge with end vertices   and   to the Wheatstone network 
in Figure 3(e) (Milchtaich 2006b). Moreover, there are network congestion games with 
player-specific linear cost functions (with positive coefficients) on the three resulting 
networks that do not have pure-strategy equilibria.  
For a network congestion game with player-specific costs on a parallel network, and hence 
also for such a game on each of the nearly parallel networks mentioned above, finding a 
pure-strategy equilibrium is not difficult. Starting with any strategy profile, there is a simple 
algorithm that identifies a best-improvement path that ends at an equilibrium, with a length 
that is polynomial in the number of players and strategies (Milchtaich 1996). By contrast, for 
a general network it can be computationally difficult to determine whether a pure-strategy 
equilibrium exists. Ackermann and Skopalik (2007) showed that this decision problem is NP-
complete even with only two players.  
The equilibrium-existence decision problem is NP-complete even for parallel networks if the 
players differ in both their cost functions and weights (Dunkel and Schulz 2008). The 
topological existence problem, by contrast, is quite trivial for this kind of games. A game on a 
two-edge parallel network always has a pure-strategy equilibrium, but this is not so for a 
three-edge parallel network even in the case of only three players (Milchtaich 1996). 
4.3  Matroid congestion games 
Each (two-terminal) network topology entails a particular set of combinatorial restrictions 
on the players’ strategy sets in all corresponding network congestion games. For example, 
for any topology, different strategies are incomparable in that the set of edges in one 
strategy is not a subset of that in any other strategy. The restrictions take an extreme form 
in the case of parallel networks, which correspond to so-called singleton congestion games: 
each player simply chooses one allowable edge. This observation leads to the question of 
whether the existence of equilibrium in the latter and similar classes of network congestion 
games can be linked directly to the combinatorial structure of the strategy sets, rather than 
to the network topology that gives rise to that structure. Specifically, Ackermann et al. 
(2009) presented the following combinatorial version of the existence problem: What is the 
most general combinatorial structure for which a pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to 19 
exist in every corresponding congestion game in which players may differ in their weights, 
and what is that structure when players differ in their cost functions? The congestion games 
that the two versions of the problem refer to are more general than the corresponding 
network congestion games considered in this paper. Each player’s strategy set is an arbitrary 
collection of subsets of a common set of “resources”, which may or may not be the edges of 
a network.  
As Ackermann et al. (2009) showed, the most general games of both kinds for which the 
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed are matroid congestion games, in which the strategy 
set of each player consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of resources. These games 
share with singleton congestion games the property (which reflects the corresponding 
property of bases of a matroid) that all strategies of a player include the same number of 
resources, but they allow for much more varied and elaborate combinatorial structures, 
such as strategy sets that consist of all pairs of resources. However, a noteworthy aspect of 
these results is that they do not take into account how the strategy sets of different players 
interweave. This means, in particular, that the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium in 
weighted network congestion games and network congestion games with player-specific 
costs may be guaranteed even if the players share a common strategy set that does not 
consist of the bases of a matroid, for example, if some allowable routes includes fewer 
edges than others (which is normally the case for the networks in Figure 3(b)–(e)). The 
results only entails that, with such a strategy set, it is possible to systematically substitute a 
different edge for each allowable edge for each player, such that with the modified strategy 
sets a pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist. However, a strategy modified in this way is 
not necessarily a route in the network. 
The positive part of the solution to the combinatorial equilibrium-existence problem 
obtained by Ackermann et al. (2009) does apply to network congestion games. However, its 
usefulness for the graph-theoretic version studied in the present paper is limited. This 
assessment is based on the following fact.  
Proposition 1. In a network congestion game on a two-terminal network  , the strategy set 
of a player consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of edges if and only if the sub-
network of   that includes only the edges belonging to the player’s allowable routes is 
parallel or is made of several parallel networks connected in series. 
Proof. It has to be shown that the first condition (the matroid property) is equivalent to the 
following graph theoretic one: the player’s allowable routes all have the exact same vertices 
and pass them in the same order. Since different routes have incomparable sets of edges, 
the routes’ sets of edges are the bases of a matroid if and only if they satisfy the bijective 
exchange axiom (White 1986): there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets of 
edges in any pair of allowable routes, such that replacing any edge   in one route with the 
corresponding edge    in the other route again gives the set of edges in some allowable 
route. Clearly, the corresponding edges   and    must have the same end vertices. 
Therefore, the bijective exchange axiom is equivalent to the above graph theoretic 
condition.  ∎  20 
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